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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 17-1710 
_____________ 
 
MAGDIEL MONDRAGON-GONZALEZ, 
    Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                           Respondent 
    
_____________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an  
Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
A060-104-346 
Immigration Judge: Walter A. Durling 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 16, 2017 
______________ 
 
Before:  VANASKIE, SHWARTZ, and FUENTES, Circuit 
Judges 
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(Filed: January 29, 2018) 
 
Bridget Cambria, Esq. 
Cambria & Kline 
532 Walnut Street 
Reading, PA 19601 
 Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant Magdiel Mondragon- 
 Gonzalez 
 
Attorney General Jeff Sessions, Esq. 
Janette L. Allen, Esq. 
Jennifer A. Bowen, Esq. 
Barbara J. Leen, Esq. 
Anthony C. Payne, Esq. 
Jessica D. Strokus, Esq. 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division 
P.O. Box 848 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC 20044 
 Counsel for Defendant-Appellee Attorney General for 
 the United States of America 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
Magdiel Mondragon-Gonzalez petitions for review of a 
final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals upholding an 
Immigration Judge’s decision directing that Mondragon-
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Gonzalez be removed from the United States.  The BIA 
determined that Mondragon-Gonzalez’s conviction of 
unlawful contact with a minor in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 6318(a)(5) is a “crime of child abuse” constituting grounds 
for removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).  We agree 
with the BIA’s determination and will thus deny the petition 
for review.  
I. 
Mondragon-Gonzalez was admitted to the United States 
near El Paso, Texas in August 2008 on an immigrant visa.  In 
April 2015, he pled guilty to unlawful contact with a minor.1  
Specifically, Mondragon-Gonzalez pled guilty to violating 18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6318(a)(5), which provides: 
A person commits an offense if he is 
intentionally in contact with a minor, or a law 
enforcement officer acting in the performance of 
his duties who has assumed the identity of a 
minor, for the purpose of engaging in an activity 
prohibited under any of the following, and either 
the person initiating the contact or the person 
being contacted is within this Commonwealth: 
                                              
1 In his guilty plea, Mondragon-Gonzales admitted to 
sending photos of his penis to a “XXX year old girl.”  (A52).  
The sentencing court  indicated that Mondragon-Gonzalez 
contacted the female juvenile for the purpose of engaging in 
activity prohibited under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6312, i.e., 
sexual abuse of children.   
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(5) Sexual abuse of children as defined in section 
6312 (relating to sexual abuse of children). 
The state trial court sentenced Mondragon-Gonzales to a 
prison term of 8 to 23 months. 
 On December 14, 2015, the Department of Homeland 
Security (“DHS”) commenced proceedings to deport 
Mondragon-Gonzalez on the basis of his state court conviction.  
On March 1, 2016, the Immigration Judge found that 
Mondragon-Gonzalez’s conviction fell within 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(E)(i), one of the three statutory grounds for removal 
advanced by DHS.2  Section 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), in pertinent part, 
provides that “[a]ny alien who at any time after admission is 
convicted of . . . a crime of child abuse . . . is deportable.”  The 
Immigration Judge concluded that Mondragon-Gonzalez’s 
conviction constituted a “crime of child abuse” as that phrase 
has been interpreted by the BIA.    
Agreeing with the Immigration Judge, the BIA 
dismissed Mondragon-Gonzalez’s appeal.  In doing so, the 
BIA compared the elements of the state criminal conviction 
and its interpretation of a “crime of child abuse” articulated in 
Matter of Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 503 (BIA 2008); 
                                              
2 The Immigration Judge rejected the other two 
grounds for removal asserted by DHS: (1) that Mondragon-
Gonzalez’s conviction constituted an “aggravated felony” 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(43)(A)(sexual abuse of a minor), and (2) his 
conviction qualified as an “aggravated felony” as defined in  
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(I)(child pornography).    
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Matter of Soram, 25 I. & N. Dec. 378 (BIA 2010); and Matter 
of Mendoza Osorio, 26 I. & N. Dec. 703 (BIA 2016).  The 
Board found that the Immigration Judge was correct in 
sustaining the grounds for removal under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) 
because Mondragon-Gonzalez’s conviction satisfied the 
elements of the crime of child abuse as established in the BIA’s 
precedential decisions.  Mondragon-Gonzalez timely 
petitioned for review by our Court.   
II. 
Mondragon-Gonzalez challenges the BIA decision on 
two grounds.  First, he argues that the Board’s definition of 
what constitutes a crime of child abuse is unreasonable and 
should not be afforded Chevron deference.  Second, he insists 
that the Pennsylvania law of which he stands convicted is not 
a categorical match of the BIA’s interpretation of what 
constitutes a “crime of child abuse.” 
We accord de novo  review to questions of law, 
including the BIA’s interpretation of the INA, subject to the 
deference dictated by Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837 (1984); 
Cheruku v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 662 F.3d 198, 202 (3d Cir. 
2011).  Under Chevron, we take a two-step approach, first 
deciding whether the statutory provision interpreted by the 
BIA is ambiguous and then, if it is, giving deference to the 
BIA’s reasonable interpretation of the INA.  De Leon-Ochoa 
v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 622 F.3d 341, 348 (3d Cir. 2010). 
III. 
The crime of child abuse is not defined in the INA.  
Moreover, the meaning of the phrase, “crime of child abuse,” 
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as used in § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) is not plain and unambiguous.  See 
Florez v. Holder, 779 F.3d 207, 211 (2d Cir. 2015).  We 
therefore must view the term as ambiguous, i.e., requiring 
interpretation, and proceed to the second step of the Chevron 
inquiry:  “whether the BIA’s interpretation ‘is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.’”  Id.   
 In Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 508, the BIA 
considered the legislative history of  § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), and 
surveyed both state and federal law defining the term “child 
abuse” at the time Congress enacted the current provision.  Id. 
at 508-13.  The Board arrived at the following working 
definition, interpreting the term broadly to mean:  
 [A]ny offense involving an intentional, knowing, 
reckless, or criminally negligent act or omission 
that constitutes maltreatment of a child or that 
impairs a child’s physical or mental well-being, 
including sexual abuse or exploitation.  At a 
minimum, this definition encompasses 
convictions for offenses involving the infliction 
on a child of physical harm, even if slight; mental 
or emotional harm, including acts injurious to 
morals; sexual abuse, including direct acts of 
sexual contact, but also including acts that 
induce (or omissions that permit) a child to 
engage in . . . sexually explicit conduct…. 
Id. 512.  Building on this broad definition, the BIA held in a 
subsequent precedential opinion that the crime of child abuse 
is not limited to crime that require actual proof of injury to a 
minor—i.e., evidence of a physical act.  Matter of Soram, 25 I. 
& N. Dec. 378, 380-81 (BIA 2010). 
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Based on the case law and legislative history, we cannot 
say that the Board’s interpretation of a crime of child abuse is 
unreasonable.  As the BIA explained in Matter of Velazquez-
Herrera, § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) “was enacted . . . as part of an 
aggressive legislative movement to expand the criminal 
grounds of deportability in general and to create a 
‘comprehensive statutory scheme to cover crimes against 
children’ in particular.”  24 I. & N. Dec. at 508-09 (quoting 
Matter of Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 991, 994 (BIA 
1999)).  Given Congress’ evident intent to make crimes that 
harm children deportable offenses, we do not find the BIA’s 
interpretation in this regard to be “arbitrary, capricious, or 
manifestly contrary to the statute.”  Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 
221, 224 (3d Cir. 2004).  We, therefore, must defer to its 
definition of “crime of child abuse.”3  Accord Florez, 779 F.3d 
at 212.   
 Mondragon-Gonzalez’s second argument—that his 
conviction under § 6318(a)(5) is not a categorical match to a 
crime of child abuse as defined by the BIA––is also unavailing.  
The BIA correctly determined that the Pennsylvania statute at 
issue satisfies the necessary intent to be considered child abuse 
                                              
3 We recognize that the Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit declined to accord deference to the BIA's construction 
of a crime of child abuse as articulated in Velazquez-Herrera 
and Soram.  See Ibarra v. Holder, 736 F.3d 903, 915-18 (10th 
Cir. 2013).  However, even if Ibarra's criticisms of the BIA's 
interpretation are persuasive, Mondragon-Gonzalez's 
conviction here would still constitute a crime of child abuse 
because his conviction does not fall within the “criminally 
negligent” aspect of a crime of child abuse, which is what the 
Ibarra court deemed unreasonable. 
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under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).  Velasquez-Herrera, 24 I. &. N. Dec. 
at 512 (a crime of child abuse includes crimes “involving an 
intentional, knowing, reckless, or criminally negligent act or 
omission”).  By its plain language, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 
6318(a)(5) requires intentional contact with a minor for the 
purpose of engaging in sexual abuse of children. 
Second, the Pennsylvania statute meets the generic 
definitional requirement in § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), that the act 
committed by the offender constitute maltreatment of a child 
such that there was a sufficiently high risk of harm to a child’s 
physical or mental well-being.  See Matter of Mendoza Osorio, 
26 I. & N. Dec. at 704-05.  Mondragon-Gonzalez argues that 
the Pennsylvania statute does not involve a sufficiently high 
risk of harm to a child because the statute only criminalizes 
communication with a child.  Mondragon-Gonzalez, however, 
ignores the fact that a conviction under the Pennsylvania 
statute requires that the perpetrator “contacts or communicates 
with the minor for the purpose of engaging in the prohibited 
activity.”  Com. v. Morgan, 913 A.2d 906, 910 (2006) 
(emphasis in original).  Thus, a conviction would not occur 
under the statute unless it had already been proven that the 
communication was intended for an illicit sexual purpose, and 
this is sufficient to create a high risk of harm to a child.  
In his Reply Brief, Mondragon-Gonzalez seizes upon 
the recent decision in Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 
1562 (2017), to argue that a child for purposes of the INA’s use 
of the term “crime of child abuse” means someone under the 
age of 16.  Because Pennsylvania defines “minor” for purposes 
of the crime of unlawful contact with a minor as a person 
“under 18 years of age,” see 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6318(c), 
Mondragon-Gonzalez contends that the BIA erred in 
Velazquez-Herrera in holding that Congress intended that the 
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crime of child abuse cover individuals under the age of 18.   He 
argues that the Pennsylvania crime of unlawful contact with a 
minor is broader than the INA “crime of child abuse,” and thus 
his conviction cannot serve as predicate for his deportation.   
Mondragon-Gonzalez’s reliance upon Esquivel-
Quintana is misplaced.  The Court there was confronted with 
the question of “whether a conviction under a state statute 
criminalizing consensual sexual intercourse between a 21–
year–old and a 17–year–old qualifies as sexual abuse of a 
minor under the INA.”  Esquivel-Quintana, 137 S. Ct. at 1567.  
Noting that the “age of consent” is the determinative factor in 
the generic offense of statutory rape, and the consensus view is 
that the age of consent is 16, the Court concluded that the state 
statute at issue did not categorically fall within the generic 
offense of statutory rape.  Id. at 1568.  Accordingly, the state 
conviction in that case could not serve as the predicate for 
removal.   
Significantly, the Court did not decide that the generic 
crime of “sexual abuse of a minor” could never occur when the 
victim was at least 16 years old.  On the contrary, the Court 
indicated that consensual sex that occurred as a result of the 
perpetrator abusing a position of trust could qualify as “sexual 
abuse of a minor” even if the victim is 17 years-old.  Id. at 
1572.  Thus, Esquivel-Quintana does not support Mondragon-
Gonzalez’s claim that the “crime of child abuse” is limited to 
children under the age of 16.  Indeed, Esquivel-Quintana has 
no application here at all. 
IV. 
 Based on the foregoing, we will deny the petition for 
review.  
